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Abstract—Wireless power transfer (WPT) is a promising tech-
nology to prolong the lifetime of the sensors and communication
devices, i.e., workers, in completing crowdsourcing tasks by
providing continuous and cost-effective energy supplies. In this
paper, we propose a wireless powered spatial crowdsourcing
framework which consists of two mutually dependent phases:
task allocation phase and data crowdsourcing phase. In the
task allocation phase, we propose a Stackelberg game based
mechanism for the spatial crowdsourcing platform to efficiently
allocate spatial tasks and wireless charging power to each worker.
In the data crowdsourcing phase, the workers may have an
incentive to misreport its real working location to improve its
utility, which causes adverse effects to the spatial crowdsourcing
platform. To address this issue, we present three strategyproof
deployment mechanisms for the spatial crowdsourcing platform
to place a mobile base station, e.g., vehicle or robot, which is
responsible for transferring the wireless power and collecting the
crowdsourced data. As the benchmark, we first apply the classical
median mechanism and evaluate its worst-case performance.
Then, we design a conventional strategyproof deployment mecha-
nism to improve the expected utility of the spatial crowdsourcing
platform under the condition that the workers’ locations follow
a known geographical distribution. For a more general case
with only the historical location data available, we propose a
deep learning based strategyproof deployment mechanism to
maximize the spatial crowdsourcing platform’s utility. Extensive
experimental results based on synthetic and real-world datasets
reveal the effectiveness of the proposed framework in allocating
tasks and charging power to workers while avoiding the dishonest
worker’s manipulation.
Index Terms—Spatial crowdsourcing, deep learning, wireless
power transfer, facility location, generalized median mechanism,
automated mechanism design
I. INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing is becoming a popular paradigm which
efficiently completes tasks and solves problems by aggre-
gating information and intelligence from crowds. Integrated
with advanced sensing and communication techniques, mobile
devices can help complete diverse location-aware tasks, such
as the large-scale data acquisition and analysis in real-time
traffic monitoring1 or weather monitoring and forecasting [1]
at different places. By focusing on the geospatial data, a new
Copyright (c) 2019 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted.
However, permission to use this material for any other purposes must be
obtained from the IEEE by sending a request to pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
Yutao Jiao and Dusit Niyato are with the School of Computer Science
and Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Ping Wang
is with the Lassonde School of Engineering, York University, Canada. Bin
Lin is with the College of Information Science and Technology, Dalian
Maritime University, China. Dong In Kim is with the School of Information
and Communication Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, Korea.
1An example is the crowdsourcing-based traffic and navigation app “Waze”
(https://www.waze.com).
paradigm called spatial crowdsourcing (SC) [2] has received
increasing attention in the last few years [3], [4], [5]. Typically,
there are three entities in the SC system, including an online
SC platform, requesters and workers. As a core component of
the SC ecosystem, the SC platform is a broker which allows
requesters to post tasks and recruits workers to complete them.
Each employed worker then stays at or travels to its target task
area to collect and transmit the requested data back. Since
the relationship between the SC platform and the workers
are incentive-driven, we study the interactions between them
to understand and develop an effective mechanism to enable
sustainable and efficient operations of the SC systems.
Most existing work assumes that there is always reliable
communication infrastructure and enough energy available
for workers to complete the data transmission. However, this
assumption may not be realistic, especially when the workers
have to perform tasks in remote areas without a wireless base
station. Moreover, workers can be battery-powered wireless
mobile devices. Their energy constraint limits the working
time and ultimately affects the task completion. Fortunately,
some studies [6], [7], [8] in wireless powered sensor networks
have illustrated the feasibility of using wireless power transfer
(WPT) [9] in sensing data collection to prolong the lifetime
of sensors. Given this, we consider a paradigm called wireless
powered spatial crowdsourcing where the SC platform deploys
a mobile base station (BS), e.g., robots, drones or vehicles,
to assist the data collection. The mobile BS serves as the
infrastructure for communication and wireless power transfer.
A typical scenario suitable for applying this paradigm is the
information collection in an emergency rescue mission. The
requester can be the relief headquarter which needs the SC
platform to organize workers to continually transmit the live
video or environmental monitoring data from the target task
area, e.g., seismic site. These data and data analytics results
will significantly help to increase the efficiency of succour.
Meanwhile, those workers with battery-powered devices will
need wireless charging due to the possible power outage.
To ensure successful and stable operations of the crowd-
sourcing system, designing an incentive mechanism that stim-
ulates workers’ participation and efficiently allocates tasks is
essential. A number of studies have proposed mechanisms
satisfying various requirements, such as profitability, strate-
gyproofness, i.e., truthfulness, and individual rationality [10],
[11]. Nevertheless, in wireless powered spatial crowdsourcing
networks, the reward offered by the SC platform to workers
can be the wireless power supply, which is location-dependent.
The major difference from those existing mechanisms, the
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2incentive of which is based on the monetary reward2. The
difference introduces a few major issues for incentive mech-
anism design in wireless powered crowdsourcing networks,
and the following questions have to be answered. First, what
is the optimal total charging power supply for the SC platform
to configure for maximizing its utility? The SC platform
can encourage workers to transmit sensed data at a higher
transmission rate, i.e., more collected data per unit time, but
it is at the cost of a higher power supply. Second, how to
allocate the tasks and charging power to workers which are
spatially distributed in the target task area? The allocation is
based on not only each worker’s sensing cost but also the
working location, which affects the communication cost and
transferred power. Note that the workers’ sensing cost and
working location can be private information and unknown
to the SC platform. Lastly, how to deploy the mobile BS
taking the workers’ strategic behaviours into account? Since
the workers’ working locations are private, workers need to
report their locations before the mobile BS chooses the best
location to deploy.
Under the assumption of rationality, a worker may dishon-
estly misreport its location to increase its utility while reducing
the SC platform’s utility. Figure 1 shows such an example.
In the task area, there are one dishonest worker at location
LA and two honest workers respectively at locations LB and
LC. The SC platform would place the mobile BS at LM for
optimal utility if all the workers report true locations LA, LB
and LC . However, the dishonest worker has the incentive to
report a fake location L′A, so that according to the reported
locations L′A, LB and LC, the mobile BS will be deployed at
L′M. In this case, the dishonest worker at LA can be closer to
the mobile BS and then enjoy more transferred power from
the mobile BS while consuming less power to transmit its
sensed data. This inevitably increases other workers’ and SC
platform’s energy consumption and damages their utility. Most
current studies on incentive mechanisms for the crowdsourcing
system have not addressed such issue yet. In this paper, we
Fig. 1. An example where a dishonest worker misreports its true location.
propose a strategyproof and energy-efficient SC framework
which jointly solves the problems of task and wireless charg-
ing power allocation as well as the truthful working location
2The monetary reward can be tokens, virtual money, reputation, etc.
reporting. In the framework, there are two phases: task alloca-
tion phase and data crowdsourcing phase. In the task allocation
phase, the SC platform determines and announces a fixed total
charging power supply. Each worker interested in participating
needs to choose and submits the preferred crowdsourcing plan,
i.e., its data transmission rate to the SC platform. In return,
they can obtain the corresponding portion of the supplied
charging power from the SC platform. We use the Stackelberg
game to model the interactions between workers and the
SC platform, in which each worker’s transmission rate and
allocated power can be determined. In the data crowdsourcing
phase, the mobile BS requests for workers’ working locations.
Based on the Moulin’s generalization median rule [12], we
present three strategyproof mobile BS deployment mecha-
nisms for the mobile BS to determine its service location.
The first one is the classical median mechanism. The other two
mechanisms are designed from the Bayesian viewpoint. One is
a conventional mechanism which assumes that each worker’s
working location follows a priori known distribution. For more
general scenarios with only historical working location data
available, we resort to the advanced deep learning technique
to develop another mechanism for higher robustness and larger
utility.
The major contributions of this paper can be summarized
as follows:
• We propose a strategyproof and energy-efficient frame-
work for implementing the wireless powered spatial
crowdsourcing. The task allocation phase and the data
crowdsourcing phase jointly coordinate the task/power
allocation and the mobile BS deployment to maximize
the SC platform’s utility.
• We propose an incentive mechanism for the task and
wireless power transfer allocation based on the Stack-
elberg game model in the task allocation phase. We
prove that a unique Nash equilibrium exists among work-
ers’ strategies, i.e., the data transmission rates, and the
Stackelberg equilibrium can be efficiently calculated to
optimize the SC platform’s utility.
• In the data crowdsourcing phase, we first present two
strategyproof mobile BS deployment mechanisms to pre-
vent the dishonest worker’s manipulation while maximiz-
ing the SC platform’s utility under different scenarios
respectively with 1) no prior information 2) prior location
distribution. Moreover, for the complex scenario with
only historical working location data available, we utilize
the deep learning technique and construct a novel deep
neural network to design a strategyproof deployment
mechanism.
• Based on synthetic and real-world datasets, the experi-
mental results illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed
incentive mechanisms in assisting the SC platform in
allocating the task and charging power efficiently. In
particular, the deep learning based mechanism shows
significant improvement in performance and stability
compared with the conventional mechanism.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that in-
vestigates the incentive mechanism design in wireless powered
3Fig. 2. Wireless powered spatial crowdsourcing system with two phases.
spatial crowdsourcing and, for the first time, the deep learning
method to address the problem of potential working location
misreporting in spatial crowdsourcing systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we discuss the related work and motivations in detail. In
Section III, we describe the system model of wireless powered
spatial crowdsourcing. Section IV proposes the task and charg-
ing power allocation mechanism. In Section V, we present
three mechanisms for strategyproof mobile BS deployment
in the data crowdsourcing phase. In Section VI, we provide
the experimental results. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK AND MOTIVATIONS
There have already been studies about the incentive mech-
anisms in crowdsourcing systems [11], [13]. The authors
in [11] proposed platform-centric and user-centric incentive
mechanisms, respectively based on the Stackelberg game and
the reverse auction. Each worker is free to determine its
own strategy, i.e., working time or cost, for a reward. Some
desirable economic properties, such as strategyproofness3 and
individual rationality, are guaranteed in the auction. In [13], the
authors designed a reputation-based incentive mechanism and
used the repeated gift-giving game in analyzing the interaction
between task requesters and workers. The authors in [14]
made use of the historical data about the workers’ visiting
records to the task locations to investigate workers’ skills. For
crowdsourcing in wireless-powered task-oriented networks, a
game-based distributive incentive mechanism was proposed
in [15] for reducing energy consumption while ensuring task
completion. Particularly, in [15], the authors also used the
energy as the reward and introduced an energy bank as the
trusted medium of the energy service exchange to avoid using
the unreliable and unspecific monetary reward among the
workers. However, to the best of our knowledge, most of the
3We use “strategyproofness” and “truthfulness” interchangeably in this
paper.
existing studies on the crowdsourcing rely on the monetary
transfer, i.e., payment, to guarantee the property of truthful-
ness in reporting private valuations. Moreover, none of the
existing work has addressed the issue that a dishonest worker
could possibly misreport its working location and manipulate
the crowdsourcing system in the data crowdsourcing phase,
which cannot be solved using monetary transfer. The study of
approximate mechanism design without money was initialized
in [16], where the authors discussed the strategyproof single
facility deployment mechanism in one-dimensional space.
The authors in [17] designed two neural network structures,
including MoulinNet and RegretNet, to solve the strategyproof
multiple facilities location problem in one-dimensional space.
Inspired by these works, we propose mobile BS deployment
mechanisms for the SC system, which can achieve high utility
while guaranteeing the strategyproofness without any money
or reward transfer.
III. SYSTEM MODEL: WIRELESS POWERED SPATIAL
CROWDSOURCING MARKET
Figure 2 depicts the wireless powered spatial crowdsourcing
system model where there are three entities, including the
requesters, the SC platform residing in the cloud and the
workers with mobile sensing devices. The workers can be
human, unmanned vehicles or robots. Initially, the requesters
publish spatial tasks with requirements, such as the target task
area, the task duration, and the sensed data type. Then, the SC
platform advertises the task information to workers on behalf
of the requesters and collects the crowdsourced or sensed
data. As shown in Fig. 3, we denote by N = {1, . . . , N}
the set of workers and denote by At the task area on a
Cartesian coordinate plane. The worker i’s working location
Li is described by a 2-tuple, i.e., Li∈N = (xi, yi). We use
LM = (xM, yM) ∈ At ⊆ R2 to represent the deployed mobile
BS’s service location projected on the XY-plane and use h
to denote its height. We assume that each worker knows its
preferred area to work, i.e., working area, such as the area near
4Fig. 3. Data transmission and power transfer in the data crowdsourcing phase.
to its commuting route or around home [18]. In the task area,
worker i has its own working area Ai and its working location
Li falls in this area, i.e., Li ∈ Ai ⊆ At ⊆ R2. In this section,
we first model the power cost of communication and sensing
for the mobile BS and workers in the data crowdsourcing
phase. Then, we elaborate on both the task allocation phase
and the data crowdsourcing phase and present the problem
formulations.
A. Power cost model
1) Worker’s power cost: We consider a frequency divi-
sion duplexing (FDD) system where sufficient channels are
available to ensure interference-free transmission. Note that
with this assumption, we can better focus on the incentive
mechanism design between the SC platform and workers.
Furthermore, we assume that the communication channels are
dominated by line-of-sight (LoS) links. Given the mobile BS’s
service location LM, we can write the worker i’s transmission
rate according to Shannon’s formula as follows:
ri = Blog2
(
1 +
P ti δ
σ2dαi
)
= Blog2
(
1 +
P ti g
dαi
)
(1)
where g = δσ2 is the channel gain to noise ratio (CNR),
δ represents the corresponding channel power gain at the
reference distance of 1 meter, σ2 is the noise power at the
receiver mobile BS, B is the channel bandwidth, P ti is worker
i’s data transmission power, and α ≥ 2 is the path-loss
exponent. In addition, we define
di = di(LM) = d((xi, yi), (xM, yM))
=
√
(xi − xM)2 + (yi − yM)2 + h2 (2)
as the Euclidean distance between the worker i and the mobile
BS. Again, h is the height of the mobile BS. Hereby, we can
derive the worker i’s transmission power as
P ti =
(2
ri
B − 1)
g
dαi . (3)
Besides the power used to transmit data, for the worker i,
we have the power cost function of data sensing P si = biri
where bi is the energy cost per bit. Here, the power cost
of data sensing is linear to the sampling rate [19], i.e., the
transmission rate. Therefore, the worker i’s total power cost
Pi can be expressed as follows:
Pi = P
t
i + P
s
i =
(2
ri
B − 1)
g
dαi + biri. (4)
2) Power cost of the mobile base station: The mobile BS
consumes energy mainly for WPT to workers. If the charging
power transferred to the worker i is P ci , the mobile BS at the
service location has to consume power P c
′
i as follows [20]:
P c
′
i =
P ci d
α
i
ηΓ
= P ci d
α
i κ, (5)
where κ = 1ηΓ , 0 < η < 1 denotes the receiver energy
conversion efficiency, Γ denotes the combined antenna gain
at the reference distance of 1 meter.
B. Utility function in the wireless powered spatial crowd-
sourcingsystem
We define the utility of the crowdsourced data based on the
transmission rate, which combines two common metrics, i.e.,
the data size and timeliness. For example, the requesters may
perform the data analysis and prediction based on the real-
time crowdsourced data. Higher data transmission rate means
that the requesters can process more data during a unit time
and yield more accurate prediction results. The utility of the
crowdsourced data is equivalent to the utility of the SC task
completion. The utility q of data collected from the SC task
completion is calculated by
q(r) = a1 log(1 +
∑
i∈N
log(1 + a2ri)), (6)
where r = (r1, r2, . . . , rN ) is the transmission rate vector
reported by workers, a1 and a2 are parameters. The inner
logarithmic function reflects the SC platform’s diminishing
return of the worker i’s contribution, and the outer logarithmic
function reflects the diminishing return of all participating
workers’ contributions [21], [22]. In this paper, the mobile
BS serves as a dedicated power transmitter which applies
5the directional beamforming technique [23]. Taking the power
cost of WPT (5) into consideration, the SC platform’s utility
function can be expressed as [23]
um = q(r)−
∑
i∈N
P c
′
i
= a1 log(1 +
∑
i∈N
log(1 + a2ri))−
∑
i∈N
P ci d
α
i κ. (7)
Similarly, we obtain the worker i’s utility function as
ui = P
c
i − Pi = P ci −
(2
ri
B − 1)
g
dαi − biri. (8)
C. The procedure of wireless powered spatial crowdsourcing
Note that we aim to maximize the SC platform’s utility.
Recalling the utility functions in (7) and (8), how to determine
each worker’s transmission rate and charging power as the
reward and where to deploy the mobile BS are two critical
issues for utility maximization.
1) Task allocation phase: Before the mobile BS departs
to collect data and workers execute the assigned tasks, the
SC platform announces a total charging power supply Pc
(Pc =
∑
j∈N P
c
j ) to assist workers in the data crowdsourcing.
The charging power P ci transferred to worker i is propor-
tional to its contribution (the data transmission rate), i.e.,
P ci =
ri
RPc =
ri∑
j∈N rj
Pc. Based on the sensing tasks and the
other workers’ responses, each worker reports the preferred
data rate ri to maximize its own utility. In practice, the
SC platform may serve as a relay to receive and broadcast
the workers’ responses. As workers have not determined the
suitable working place and perform the allocated task, they
are exposed to uncertainty of working location Li and the
mobile BS’s service location LM which are only known
in the next data crowdsourcing phase. We assume that the
workers are risk-averse, which means that they choose to
minimize the uncertainty and avoid any possible loss in the
future. This concept can be found in the well-known prospect
theory [24]. A common example is that a majority of people
prefer to deposit money at the bank for safekeeping and low
return instead of buying financial products with a high risk of
loss. Note that given the power supply and other workers’
transmission rates, the worker i’s utility function in (8) is
monotonically decreasing with di. Since the worker i knows
its working area Ai and the task area At, it can obtain
the maximum value of di, i.e., Di = maxLM∈At,Li∈Ai di.
Therefore, if the worker i plans the transmission rate ri for
the worst case where Di is its distance from the mobile BS,
the worker i will achieve the utility which is not lower than the
worst case in the data crowdsourcing phase. In addition, we
use r−i = (r1, . . . , ri−1, ri+1, . . . , rN ) to denote the reported
transmission rate vector for all workers except the worker i.
Hereby, the worker i’s utility function in the task allocation
phase can be expressed as
u¯i(ri, r−i, Pc) =
ri∑
j∈N rj
Pc − (2
ri
B − 1)
g
Dαi − biri. (9)
The SC platform’s utility in (7) is rewritten as
u¯m(Pc, r) = a1 log(1 +
∑
i∈N
log(1 + a2ri))
−
∑
i∈N
ri∑
j∈N rj
PcD
α
i κ. (10)
2) Data crowdsourcing phase: In the task allocation phase,
the total charging power supply Pc, each worker’s allocated
charging power P ci and transmission rate ri have been deter-
mined. Each worker decides the working location according
to the task and its available working area. For example, if
the task requires collecting data about road traffic condition,
workers may choose the roadside or crossing. As our paper
mainly focuses on establishing a spatial crowdsourcing market
with wireless energy transfer and designing relevant trading
mechanisms, how to choose a good working location is beyond
our scope. Once working locations are decided, they will travel
to the working locations and the SC platform sends out the
mobile BS to serve the workers. However, the mobile BS
has to know each worker’s working location. Then, it can
determine the service location LM for maximizing the SC
platform’s utility. The worker i’s and the SC platform’s utility
functions in the data crowdsourcing phase can be respectively
expressed as
uˆi(LM) =
ri∑
j∈N rj
Pc − (2
ri
B − 1)
g
dαi (Li, LM)− biri (11)
and
uˆm(LM) = a1 log(1 +
∑
i∈N
log(1 + a2ri))
−
∑
i∈N
ri∑
j∈N rj
Pcd
α
i (Li, LM)κ. (12)
To make workers reveal their private working location Li, the
mobile BS organizes the following voting process on the spot.
1) The mobile BS first broadcasts its deployment mecha-
nism, i.e, the mechanism or rule to place the mobile BS
according to the locations reported by workers, to the
task area.
2) Once receiving the notification about the deployment
mechanism, each worker sends its working location Li
to the mobile BS.
3) Based on the collected locations and the deployment
mechanism, the service location LM is calculated for
the mobile BS to deploy.
Let M denote the applied deployment mechanism which
takes the workers’ reported working location vector L =
(L1, . . . , Li, . . . , LN) as input and outputs the mobile BS’s
service location LM, i.e., LM = M(L). During the above
voting process, a worker i may have an incentive to improve its
own utility in (11) by misreporting its true working location
Li. To make the location voting process robust and imple-
mentable, our designed mobile BS deployment mechanism
should have the property of strategyproofness (truthfulness),
which is defined as follows:
Definition 1. (Strategyproofness) Regardless of other workers’
reported locations, a worker i cannot increase the utility
by misreporting its working location Li. Formally, given a
6deployment mechanism M and a misreported location L′i, we
have
uˆi(M((Li,L−i))) ≥ uˆi(M((L′i,L−i))) ∀L′i 6= Li (13)
where L−i is the vector containing all workers’ working
locations except the worker i’s.
3) Mutual Dependence: The task allocation phase and the
data crowdsourcing phase are mutually dependent. On the one
hand, each worker’s transmission rate in data crowdsourcing is
determined from the task allocation phase. On the other hand,
a prerequisite of the successful charging power allocation is
to guarantee that the data crowdsourcing phase cannot be
strategically manipulated. The untruthful or dishonest worker
may overestimate its risk preference, i.e., the maximum dis-
tance Di, due to its deliberate manipulation. Both the two
phases affect the efficient use of the power as well as all the
participants’ utilities.
IV. TASK AND WIRELESS TRANSFERRED POWER
ALLOCATION MECHANISM
We utilize the Stackelberg game approach [25] to ana-
lyze the model introduced in the task allocation phase (Sec-
tion III-C1). There are two levels in the Stackelberg game. In
the first (upper) level, the SC platform acts as the leader which
strategizes and announces the total charging power supply Pc.
In the second (lower) level, each worker is the follower which
determines the strategy, i.e., the preferred transmission rate
r, to maximize its utility. Mathematically, the SC platform
chooses the strategy Pc by solving the following optimization
problem:
(P1) max
Pc≥0
u¯m(Pc, r).
Meanwhile, the worker i makes the decision on its reported
ri to solve the following problem:
(P2) max
ri≥0
u¯i(ri, r−i, Pc).
The objective of the Stackelberg game is to find the Stackel-
berg Equilibrium (SE). We next introduce the concept of the
SE for our proposed model.
Definition 2. (Stackelberg Equilibrium) Let P˜c be a solution
for Problem P1 and r˜ be a solution for Problem P2 of the
workers. Then, a point (P˜c, r˜) is the SE for the proposed
Stackelberg game if it satisfies the following conditions:
u¯m(P˜c, r˜) ≥ u¯m(Pc, r˜), (14)
u¯i(r˜i, r˜−i, P˜c) ≥ u¯i(ri, r˜−i, P˜c), (15)
for any (Pc, r) with Pc ≥ 0 and r  0.
In general, the first step to obtain the SE is to find the
perfect Nash Equilibrium (NE) [25] for the non-cooperative
transmission Rate Determination Game (RDG) in the lower
level. Then, we can optimize the strategy of the SC platform
at the upper level. Given a fixed Pc, the NE is defined as
a set of strategies rne = (rne1 , . . . , r
ne
N ) that no worker can
improve utility by unilaterally changing its own strategy while
other workers’ strategies are kept unchanged. Since workers
are rational and not willing to provide service for a negative
utility, they shall set ri = 0 if u¯i(ri, r−i, Pc) ≤ 0. To analyze
the NE, we introduce the concept of the concave game and
the theorem about the existence and uniqueness of NE in the
concave game.
Definition 3. (Concave game [26]) A game is called concave
if each worker i chooses a strategy ri to maximize utility u¯i,
where u¯i is concave in ri.
Theorem 1. ([26]) Concave games have (possibly multiple)
Nash Equilibrium. Define N ×N matrix function H in which
Hij =
∂2u¯i
∂ri∂rj
,i, j ∈ N . Let HT denote the transpose of H. If
H+HT is strictly negative definite, then the Nash equilibrium
is unique.
Hereby, we calculate the first-order and second-order deriva-
tives of the worker i’s utility function u¯i(ri, r−i, Pc) with
respect to ri as follows:
∂u¯i
∂ri
=
Pc
∑
k∈N−i rk
(
∑
j∈N rj)2
− D
α
i ln 2
B
2
ri
B − bi, (16)
∂2u¯i
∂r2i
= −
2Pc
∑
k∈N−i rk
(
∑
k∈N rk)3
− D
α
i ln
2 2
B2
2
ri
B . (17)
Since ∂
2u¯i
∂r2i
< 0, u¯i(ri, r−i, Pc) is a strictly concave function
with respect to ri. Then, the non-cooperative RDG is a concave
game and the NE exists when
∑
j∈N−i rj > 0. Otherwise the
worker i’s best strategy does not exist. Given any Pc > 0
and any strategy profile r−i (
∑
j∈N−i rj > 0), the worker
i’s best response strategy γi exists and is unique. To prove
the uniqueness of the NE, we also calculate the second-order
mixed partial derivative of u¯i for i ∈ N with respect to rj∈N−i
as follows:
∂2u¯i
∂r2j
=
2ri
(
∑
j∈N rj)3
Pc,
∂2u¯i
∂ri∂rj
=
ri −
∑
k∈N−i rk
(
∑
k∈N rk)3
Pc,
where ∂
2u¯i
∂r2j
≥ 0 and ∂2u¯i∂ri∂rj ≤ 0 if ri ≤
∑
k∈N−i rk, ∀i ∈
N . Then, we have the specific expression of the matrix
function H defined in Theorem 1. Furthermore, the matrix
function H + HT can be decomposed into a sum of several
N × N matrix functions: H + HT = U + V + ∑k∈NCk,
where Uij =
{
0 i 6= j
∂2u¯i
∂R2i
i = j
, Vij =
∑
k∈N
∂2u¯k
∂ri∂rj
and
Ckij =
{
0 i = k or j = k
− ∂2u¯k∂ri∂rj otherwise.
Let I denote the sum of Ckij
over N , i.e., I = ∑k∈N Ck. Since ∂2u¯i∂r2i < 0 and ∂2u¯i∂ri∂rj ≤ 0
, if ri ≤
∑
k∈N−i rk, ∀i ∈ N , we can find that U is strictly
negative definite, and V and I are negative semi-definite. Thus,
H+HT is proved to be strictly negative definite which shows
the NE in the RDG is unique. In other words, once the SC
platform decides a strategy Pc, the workers’ strategies, i.e., the
transmission rates, will be uniquely determined. We then can
use the iterative best response [27] to find the SE point P˜c in
the first level, i.e., the optimal strategy of Pc.
V. MOBILE BS DEPLOYMENT MECHANISMS IN DATA
CROWDSOURCING PHASE
Given the SE points (P˜c, r˜) calculated from the task allo-
cation phase, we use Nˆ = {1, . . . , Nˆ} (break ties randomly)
7to represent the set of employed workers whose transmission
rate r˜i > 0. Hence, the specific problems for the SC platform
in the data crowdsourcing phase is
max
LM∈At
uˆm(LM) = a1 log(1 +
∑
i∈N
log(1 + a2r˜i))
−
∑
i∈Nˆ
r˜i∑
j∈Nˆ r˜j
P˜cd
α
i (Li, LM)κ. (18)
Based on workers’ reported working locations, the SC plat-
form decides the mobile BS’s location to maximize its utility.
For simplicity, we write the equivalent problems as follows:
min
LM∈At
lˆm(LM) =
∑
i∈Nˆ
r˜i∑
j∈N r˜j
P˜cd
α
i (Li, LM)κ, (19)
where lˆm(LM) is the crowdsourcing cost of SC platform. Min-
imizing the SC platform’s crowdsourcing cost is equivalent
to maximizing its utility. Similarly, the worker i’s utility and
crowdsourcing cost can be respectively expressed as
uˆi(LM) =
r˜i∑
j∈Nˆ r˜j
P˜c − (2
r˜i
B − 1)
g
dαi (Li, LM)− bir˜i,
(20)
lˆi(LM) =
(2
r˜i
B − 1)
g
dαi (Li, LM). (21)
To address the mobile BS’s location problem introduced in
Section III-C2, we first present the classical median mech-
anism and analyze its worst-case performance. Then, we
propose a conventional mechanism to improve the utility of
the SC platform in expectation. For more general scenarios
and achieving better performance, we also propose a deep
learning based strategyproof mechanism. The design rationale
of the deep neural network is the Moulin’s generalized median
mechanism.
A. Conventional strategyproof mechanism under Bayesian set-
tings
We first introduce an important concept of 2-dimensional
single-peaked preference for the discussed problem.
Definition 4. (2-dimensional single-peaked preference [28])
Let LM be the set of possible mobile BS’s service locations
output by the deployment mechanism M on the XY-plane
where X and Y are respectively a one-dimensional axis.
The worker i’s preference for the mobile BS’s location is 2-
dimensional single-peaked with respect to (X,Y ) if 1) there
is a single most-preferred location outcome L˜Mi ∈ LM, and 2)
for any two outcomes L′M, L
′′
M ∈ LM, L′M i L′′M whenever
L′′M <ρ L
′
M <ρ L˜
M
i or L˜
M
i <ρ L
′
M <ρ L
′′
M for ∀ρ ∈ {X,Y },
i.e., both X and Y axes.
In the above definition, L′M i L′′M means that L′M is
preferred by worker i to L′′M. “<ρ” is a strict ordering by
worker i on the dimension ρ. An explanation of this condition
is that L′M is preferred by worker i to L
′′
M as long as L
′
M is
nearer to its most-preferred location L˜Mi on each dimension.
Proposition 1. In the data crowdsourcing phase, the worker’s
preference for the mobile BS’s service location is 2-
dimensional single-peaked.
Proof: We first expand the worker i’s crowdsourcing
cost function given in (21) as lˆi(LM) = lˆi(xM, yM) =
(2
r˜i
B −1)
g
(
(xi − xM)2 + (yi − yM)2 + h2
)α
2 . We can then
show that lˆi is convex with respect to (xM, yM) and there is a
unique optimal solution L˜Mi = (xi, yi) to minimizing the cost.
In other words, the worker i’s most preferred mobile BS’s ser-
vice location is its working location, i.e., L˜Mi = Li = (xi, yi),
which satisfies the first condition in Definition 4. In the task
area At, we randomly choose two locations L′M = (x
′
M, y
′
M),
L′′M = (x
′′
M, y
′′
M) ∈ At. Note that the convexity of lˆi guaran-
tees the convexity on one dimension if fixing the variable on
the other dimension is fixed. L′′M <X L
′
M <X L˜
M
i implies
that lˆi((xi, y)) < lˆi((x′M, y)) < lˆi((x
′′
M, y)) for any y on axis
Y and then |xi − x′M| < |xi − x′′M|. We can have the similar
implication from L′′M <Y L
′
M <Y L˜
M
i . If L
′′
M <X L
′
M <X
L˜Mi and L
′′
M <Y L
′
M <Y L˜
M
i are both satisfied, we can have
(xi−x′M)2 + (yi− y′M)2 < (xi−x′′M)2 + (yi− y′′M)2 and thus
lˆi(L
′
M) = lˆi((x
′
M, y
′
M)) < lˆi(L
′′
M) = lˆi((x
′′
M, y
′′
M)). Therefore,
the worker i prefers L′M to L
′′
M, i.e., L
′
M i L′′M, which proves
the condition 2 in Definition 4 and completes the proof.
Theorem 2. (Moulin’s one-dimensional generalized median
mechanism [12]) A mechanism M for single-peaked prefer-
ences in a one-dimensional space is strategyproof and anony-
mous if and only if there exist Nˆ+1 constants τ1, . . . , τNˆ+1 ∈
R ∪ (−∞,+∞) such that:
M(LM) = median(L˜M1 , . . . , L˜
M
N , τ1, . . . , τN+1) (22)
where LM = {L˜M1 , . . . , L˜MNˆ} is the set of workers’ most-
preferred mobile BS’s locations and median is the median
function. An outcome rule M is anonymous, if for any permu-
tation T ′ of T , we have M(T ′) = M(T ) for all T .
Theorem 3. (Multi-dimensional generalized median mecha-
nism [28]) A mechanism for multi-dimensional single-peaked
preferences in a multi-dimensional space is strategyproof and
anonymous if and only if it is an m-dimensional generalized
median mechanism, which straightforwardly applies the one-
dimensional generalized median mechanism on each of the m
dimensions.
Algorithm 1 MED mechanism
Input: Workers’ reported locations L = (L1, . . . , Li, . . . , LNˆ ).
Output: Mobile BS’s service location LM = (xM, yM).
1: begin
2: Repectively sort the x coordinates x = (x1, . . . , xNˆ ) and y coordinates y =
(y1, . . . , yNˆ ) of workers’ locations in ascending order.
3: if Nˆ is odd then
4: xM ← x Nˆ+1
2
, yM ← y Nˆ+1
2
5: else
6: xM ←
x
Nˆ
2
+x
Nˆ
2
+1
2 , yM ←
y
Nˆ
2
+y
Nˆ
2
+1
2
7: end if
8: end
A straightforward benchmark mechanism is the median
mechanism [12], [28], as shown in Algorithm 1. We simply
name it as MED mechanism, i.e., MMED. This algorithm
directly computes the median of workers’ reported locations
as the mobile BS’s service location. Apparently, it is a special
case of the multi-dimensional generalized median mechanism,
so it is strategyproof. We next analyze its performance by com-
8paring it with the optimal mechanism MOPT which achieves
the maximum utility of the SC platform without considering
incentive constraints. Let r˜max and r˜min respectively denote
the maximum and the minimum transmission rate among
workers, i.e., r˜max = max(r˜), r˜min = min(r˜).
Proposition 2. The benchmark MED mechanism MMED
has an approximation ratio 2
α
2 Nˆ
α
2−1 r˜max
r˜min
, which means
its worst-case performance for minimizing the SC plat-
form’s crowdsourcing cost can guarantee lˆm(MMED(L)) ≤
2
α
2 Nˆ
α
2−1 r˜max
r˜min
lˆm(MOPT(L)).
Proof: We expand the SC platform’s utility function
in (18) as follows:
lˆm((xM, yM))
=
P˜cκ∑
j∈Nˆ r˜j
∑
i∈Nˆ
(
r˜
2
α
i (xi − xM)2 + (yi − yM)2 + h2
)α
2
.
(23)
Let xmed, x and ymed, y respectively denote the median and
mean of x = (x1, . . . , xNˆ ) and y = (y1, . . . , yNˆ ). Also, we
use (xopt, yopt) to denote the optimal solution to maximizing
the utility function in (23), i.e., MOPT(L) = (xopt, yopt).
We also note that the optimal solution to minimizing the∑
i∈Nˆ r˜
2
α
i
(
(xi − xM)2 + (yi − yM)2 + h2
)
is (x∗, y∗) where
x∗ =
∑
i∈Nˆ r˜
2
α
i xi∑
i∈Nˆ r˜
2
α
i
and y∗ =
∑
i∈Nˆ r˜
2
α
i yi∑
i∈Nˆ r˜
2
α
i
. As r˜min ≤ r˜i, we
have
r˜
2
α
min
∑
i∈Nˆ
(
(xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2 + h2
)
≤
∑
i∈Nˆ
r˜
2
α
i
(
(xi − x∗)2 + (yi − y∗)2 + h2
)
. (24)
According to [29, Theorem 4.3], we have
∑
i∈Nˆ (xi −
xmed)
2 ≤ 2∑i∈Nˆ (xi − x)2 and ∑i∈Nˆ (yi − ymed)2 ≤
2
∑
i∈Nˆ (yi − y)2. Then, we can verify that
r˜
2
α
min
∑
i∈Nˆ
(
(xi − xmed)2 + (yi − ymed)2 + h2
)
≤ 2r˜ 2αmin
∑
i∈Nˆ
(
(xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2 + h2
)
, (25)
r˜min
∑
i∈Nˆ
(
(xi − xmed)2 + (yi − ymed)2 + h2
)α2
≤ 2α2 r˜min
∑
i∈Nˆ
(
(xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2 + h2
)α2
≤ 2α2 r˜min
∑
i∈Nˆ
(
(xi − x∗)2 + (yi − y∗)2 + h2
)α2
≤ 2α2
∑
i∈Nˆ
r˜
2
α
i
(
(xi − x∗)2 + (yi − y∗)2 + h2
)α2 . (26)
Since α ≥ 2, we can prove that
r˜min
∑
i∈Nˆ
(
(xi − xmed)2 + (yi − ymed)2 + h2
)α
2
≤ r˜min
∑
i∈Nˆ
(
(xi − xmed)2 + (yi − ymed)2 + h2
)α2 .
(27)
Hence, based on Theorem 1 in [30] and the fact that r˜i ≤ r˜max
and α2 ≥ 1, we can obtain
2
α
2
∑
i∈Nˆ
r˜
2
α
i
(
(xi − x∗)2 + (yi − y∗)2 + h2
)α2
≤ 2α2
∑
i∈Nˆ
r˜
2
α
i
(
(xi − xopt)2 + (yi − yopt)2 + h2
)α2
≤ 2α2 r˜max
∑
i∈Nˆ
(
(xi − xopt)2 + (yi − yopt)2 + h2
)α2
≤ 2α2 Nˆ α2−1r˜max
∑
i∈Nˆ
(
(xi − xopt)2 + (yi − yopt)2 + h2
)α
2 .
(28)
Combining the above inequalities, we have
P˜cκ∑
j∈Nˆ r˜j
∑
i∈Nˆ
(
(xi − xmed)2 + (yi − ymed)2 + h2
)α
2
≤ 2α2 Nˆ α2−1 r˜max
r˜min
P˜cκ∑
j∈Nˆ r˜j∑
i∈Nˆ
(
(xi − xopt)2 + (yi − yopt)2 + h2
)α
2 .
Finally, we can conclude that lˆm(MMED(L)) ≤
2
α
2 Nˆ
α
2−1 r˜max
r˜min
lˆm(MOPT(L)).
However, we find that the MED mechanism can be arbitrar-
ily inefficient, especially when the wireless channel path-loss
and the number of workers are large. Thanks to the workers’
historical location data kept by the SC platform, it is possible
to design mechanisms that achieve higher utility in expec-
tation. Each worker’s location (xi, yi) follows a distribution
whose joint continuous probability density function (PDF) is
Pi on its working areaAi, i.e., (xi, yi) ∼ Pi for i = 1, . . . , Nˆ .
With a slight abuse of notation, let the probability density
function of Pi at a pair of real numbers (xi, yi) be Pi(xi, yi).
Under the Bayesian setting, we propose an enhanced median-
single-constant (MSC) mechanism (shown in Algorithm 2)
where we add a single constant point (xc, yc) in the original
set of input locations and then run the median mechanism
on the new set. According to Theorems 2 and 3, the MSC
mechanism is equivalent to respectively setting one constant
on each dimension at a fixed value while setting the half of
the other constants at the positive infinity and the remaining
half at the negative infinity. Hence, its design rationale follows
the multi-dimensional generalized median mechanism and is
strategyproof. We obtain vectors x = (x1, . . . , xNˆ ) and y =
(y1, . . . , yNˆ ) from L = ((x1, y1), . . . , (xi, yi), . . . , (xNˆ , yNˆ )).
Let (xmed, ymed) = MMED(L) and (xmsc, ymsc) = MMSC(L)
9respectively be the outcome from the MED mechanism and
the MSC mechanism. Next, we analyze their expected per-
formance. With E[·] denoting the expectation, for the SC
Algorithm 2 MSC mechanism
Input: Workers’ reported locations L = (L1, . . . , Li, . . . , LNˆ ) where Li =
(xi, yi), i ∈ Nˆ and the worker’s location distribution Pi(xi, yi), i ∈ Nˆ .
Output: Mobile BS’s service location LM = (xM, yM).
1: begin
2: Calculate xc and yc based on Pi(xi, yi), i ∈ Nˆ .
3: Add the constant point (xc, yc) to L, i.e., Lc ← L ∪ (xc, yc).
4: Run the median mechanism on the new Lc (Nˆ + 1 location points) and output
the xM and yM.
5: end
platform’s crowdsourcing cost lˆm in (19), we compute
E(xi,yi)∼Pi, i∈Nˆ [lˆm(MMED(L))]
=
∫∫
(x1,y1)∈A1 · · ·
∫∫
(xNˆ ,yNˆ )∈ANˆ lˆm(MMED(L))
P1(x1, y1) · · · PN (xNˆ , yNˆ ) dx1 · · · dxNˆdy1 · · · dyNˆ . (29)
For ease of the analysis, we assume that all workers are
independently and identically distributed following the same
continuous PDF P on the domain A in the rest of the
subsection. In order to simplify the operation with symmetry,
we first define and investigate lˆm(MMED(L)) by setting each
worker’s transmission rate r˜i = 1. As the PDF is continuous,
we consider only the case where x1, . . . , xNˆ , y1, . . . , yNˆ are
all different. When x1, . . . , xNˆ , y1, . . . , yNˆ are all different, to
sort x1, . . . , xNˆ and y1, . . . , yNˆ in ascending order, we have
(Nˆ !)2 possibilities. Hence, it follows that
E(xi,yi)∼P, i∈Nˆ [lˆm(MMED(L))] (30)
=
∫∫
(x1,y1)∈A
· · ·
∫∫
(xNˆ ,yNˆ )∈A
lˆm(MMED(L))
P(x1, y1) · · · P(xNˆ , yNˆ ) dx1 · · · dxNˆdy1 · · · dyNˆ
= (Nˆ !)2
∫∫
(x1,y1),...,(xNˆ ,yNˆ )∈A
x1<···<xNˆ
y1<···<yNˆ
lˆm(MMED(L))
P(x1, y1) · · · P(xNˆ , yNˆ ) dx1 · · · dxNˆdy1 · · · dyNˆ . (31)
Given x1 < x2 < · · · < xNˆ and y1 < y2 < · · · < yNˆ , we can
have MMED(L) = (
x Nˆ
2
+x Nˆ
2
+1
2 ,
y Nˆ
2
+y Nˆ
2
+1
2 ) for even Nˆ and
MMED(L) = (x Nˆ+1
2
, y Nˆ+1
2
) for odd Nˆ according to the MED
mechanism (Algorithm 1). After substituting the expression of
MMED(L) into equation (31), we can combine equations (29)
and (31) to obtain
E(xi,yi)∼P, i∈Nˆ [lˆm(MMED(L))]
=

(Nˆ !)2
∫∫
(x1,y1),...,(xNˆ ,yNˆ )∈A
x1<···<xNˆ
y1<···<yNˆ
lˆm((
x Nˆ
2
+x Nˆ
2
+1
2 ,
y Nˆ
2
+y Nˆ
2
+1
2 ))
P(x1, y1) · · · P(xNˆ , yNˆ ) dx1 · · · dxNˆdy1 · · · dyNˆ ,
for even Nˆ,
(Nˆ !)2
∫∫
(x1,y1),...,(xNˆ ,yNˆ )∈A
x1<···<xNˆ
y1<···<yNˆ
lˆm((x Nˆ+1
2
, y Nˆ+1
2
))
P(x1, y1) · · · P(xNˆ , yNˆ ) dx1 · · · dxNˆdy1 · · · dyNˆ ,
for odd Nˆ.
(32)
Then, considering the symmetry of each worker, we can use
(32) to obtain the simplified expression of (29) as follows:
E(xi,yi)∼P, i∈Nˆ [lˆm(MMED(L))]
=
1
Nˆ
∑
j∈Nˆ
r˜jE(xi,yi)∼P, i∈Nˆ [lˆm(MMED(L))]. (33)
For the MSC mechanism, we study its performance in a
similar way as above and address the problem of how to
calculate the constant point (xc, yc) by leveraging the known
distribution P . Due to the symmetry and the limited space, the
following analysis just shows cases where x1 < x2 < · · · <
xNˆ , y1 < y2 < · · · < yNˆ , Nˆ is odd and the xc is smaller than
x Nˆ−1
2
, i.e., xc ≤ x Nˆ−1
2
. It can be extended for other cases
where N is even and xc is more general.
1) Case 1: When xc < x Nˆ−1
2
and yc < y Nˆ−1
2
, then
MMSC(L) = (
x Nˆ−1
2
+x Nˆ+1
2
2 ,
y Nˆ−1
2
+y Nˆ+1
2
2 ) and
E(xi,yi)∼P, i∈Nˆ [lˆm(MMSC(L))]
=
∫∫
(x1,y1),...,(xNˆ ,yNˆ )∈A
x Nˆ−3
2
<xc<x Nˆ−1
2
y Nˆ−3
2
<yc<y Nˆ−1
2
lˆm((
x Nˆ−1
2
+ x Nˆ+1
2
2
,
y Nˆ−1
2
+ y Nˆ+1
2
2
))
P(x1, y1) · · · P(xNˆ , yNˆ ) dx1 · · · dxNˆdy1 · · · dyNˆ + · · ·+︸ ︷︷ ︸
(( Nˆ−12 )
2−2) terms∫∫
(x1,y1),...,(xNˆ ,yNˆ )∈A
xc<x1
yc<y1
lˆm((
x Nˆ−1
2
+ x Nˆ+1
2
2
,
y Nˆ−1
2
+ y Nˆ+1
2
2
))
P(x1, y1) · · · P(xNˆ , yNˆ ) dx1 · · · dxNˆdy1 · · · dyNˆ . (34)
2) Case 2: When xc < x Nˆ−1
2
and y Nˆ−1
2
< yc < y Nˆ+3
2
, then
MMSC(L) = (
x Nˆ−1
2
+x Nˆ+1
2
2 ,
yc+y Nˆ+1
2
2 ) and
E(xi,yi)∼P, i∈Nˆ [lˆm(MMSC(L))]
=
∫∫
(x1,y1),...,(xN ,yN )∈A
x Nˆ−3
2
<xc<x Nˆ−1
2
y Nˆ−1
2
<yc<y Nˆ+3
2
lˆm((
x Nˆ−1
2
+ x Nˆ+1
2
2
,
yc + y Nˆ+1
2
2
))
P(x1, y1) · · · P(xNˆ , yNˆ ) dx1 · · · dxNˆdy1 · · · dyNˆ + · · ·+︸ ︷︷ ︸
(Nˆ−3) terms∫∫
(x1,y1),...,(xNˆ ,yNˆ )∈A
xc<x1
y Nˆ+1
2
<yc<y Nˆ+3
2
lˆm((
x Nˆ−1
2
+ x Nˆ+1
2
2
,
yc + y Nˆ+1
2
2
))
P(x1, y1) · · · P(xNˆ , yNˆ ) dx1 · · · dxNˆdy1 · · · dyNˆ . (35)
3) Case 3: When xc < x Nˆ−1
2
and y Nˆ+3
2
< yc, then
MMSC(L) = (
x Nˆ−1
2
+x Nˆ+1
2
2 ,
y Nˆ+1
2
+y Nˆ+3
2
2 ) and
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E(xi,yi)∼P, i∈Nˆ [lˆm(MMSC(L))]
=
∫∫
(x1,y1),...,(xNˆ ,yNˆ )∈A
x Nˆ−3
2
<xc<x Nˆ−1
2
y Nˆ+3
2
<yc<y Nˆ+5
2
lˆm((
x Nˆ−1
2
+ x Nˆ+1
2
2
,
y Nˆ+1
2
+ y Nˆ+3
2
2
))
P(x1, y1) · · · P(xNˆ , yNˆ ) dx1 · · · dxNˆdy1 · · · dyNˆ + · · ·+︸ ︷︷ ︸
(( Nˆ−12 )
2−2) terms∫∫
(x1,y1),...,(xNˆ ,yNˆ )∈A
xc<x1
yNˆ<yc
lˆm((
x Nˆ−1
2
+ x Nˆ+1
2
2
,
y Nˆ+1
2
+ y Nˆ+3
2
2
))
P(x1, y1) · · · P(xNˆ , yNˆ ) dx1 · · · dxNˆdy1 · · · dyNˆ . (36)
There are totally ((Nˆ + 1)!)2 terms similar to (36) to
compute the expected utility achieved by the MSC mechanism,
which is challenging especially when Nˆ is large. Next, we
would like to present a special case to show the possibility
and feasibility to maximize the expected utility through op-
timizing (xc, yc). In the special case, we assume that each
worker’s location follows the bivariate uniform distribution,
i.e., Pu =
{
1, (x, y) ∈ A = [0, 1]2,
0, otherwise,
and the path-loss α is
2. Then, by substituting these parameters into (29)-(32) and
using mathematical induction, we first obtain the expected
utility generated by the MED mechanism as
E(xi,yi)∼Pu, i∈Nˆ [lˆm(MMED(L))]
=
P˜cκ
(
(N−1)(N+4)
6(N+1)(N+2) + h
2
)
, for even Nˆ,
P˜cκ
(
(N−1)(N+3)
6N(N+2) + h
2
)
, for odd Nˆ.
(37)
For the MSC mechanism, we analyze a situation where there
are three employed workers, i.e., Nˆ = 3. The same way of the
analysis can be applied to any number of employed workers.
Based on the analysis above, we can calculate the expected
utility achieved by the MSC mechanism as follows:
E(xi,yi)∼P, i∈{1,2,3}[uˆm(MMSC(L))]
= P˜cκ
−x4c + y4c4 + x3c + y3c2 − x2c + y2c4 + 320︸ ︷︷ ︸
À
+ h2
 .
(38)
Then, the expected utility achieved by the MED mechanism
is
E(xi,yi)∼P, i∈{1,2,3}[uˆm(MMED(L))] = P˜cκ
(
2
15
+ h2
)
.
(39)
The minimum value of À in equation (38) is 19160 achieved at
xc = yc = 0.5, which is smaller than 215 . Hence, we can find
a constant point (xc, yc) that enables the MSC mechanism
to achieve lower expected crowdsourcing cost than that of
the benchmark MED mechanism. This also indicates the
possibility of improving and extending the MSC mechanism
for more general scenarios.
B. Deep learning based mobile BS deployment mechanism
Clearly, above conventional mechanisms, including the
MED and MSC mechanism, have several non-negligible lim-
itations:
• It is intractable to manually optimize the MSC mecha-
nism in realistic environments where path-loss exponent
α is not necessarily 2 and the number of employed
workers Nˆ may be much larger than 3.
• Each worker’s working location distribution can be differ-
ent and correlated. Despite the location distribution can
be inferred from historical data, its accurate type is not
always known or even there is no corresponding closed-
form expression for us to proceed with the theoretical
analysis.
• In the MSC mechanism, only a single constant point
is optimized while the generalized median mechanism
implies that more constant points can be used to improve
the expected performance.
To overcome the above limitations, we develop a deep learning
based mechanism named the MDL mechanism. The MDL
mechanism provides an efficient model-free method to si-
multaneously exploit the data and optimize the complicated
objective utility function while satisfying the incentive con-
straints. In the construction of the deep neural network, we use
an equivalent definition (Theorem 4) of the one-dimensional
generalized median mechanism (Theorem 2).
Theorem 4. ([12], [31], [32]) A mechanism M is a strat-
egyproof and anonymous generalized median mechanism on
one dimensional space if there exist 2Nˆ points {ζT }T ⊆Nˆ in
[ζ∅, ζNˆ ], such that 1) T ⊆ T ′ ⊆ Nˆ implies ζT ≤ ζT ′ and 2)
for all x ∈ RNˆ , M(x) = maxT ⊆Nˆ min {ζT , xi : i ∈ T }.
Fig. 4. Monotonic network νw,b mapping µ(T ) to ζT .
According to Theorem 3, we develop a two-dimensional
strategyproof mechanisms by directly applying Theorem 4
in each dimension. We adopt the data preprocessing method
in [17]. The collected location data x = (x1, . . . , xNˆ ) and
y = (y1, . . . , yNˆ ) in ascending order, i.e., xpix(1) ≤ xpix(2) ≤
· · · ≤ xpix(Nˆ) and ypiy(1) ≤ ypiy(2) ≤ · · · ≤ ypiy(Nˆ)
where pix(j) and piy(j) respectively represent the worker ID
at the jth place on X and Y axes. Usually, we normal-
ize all input data into [0, 1] in the experiments. We define
two sets Tx(j) = {pix(1), pix(2), . . . , pix(j)} and Ty(j) =
{piy(1), piy(2), . . . , piy(j)} where j ∈ Nˆ . We also establish
a monotonically increasing mapping µ(T ) to transform the
set T to the Nˆ -length binary vector z = (z1, . . . , zNˆ ) where
zi = 1 if i ∈ T and zi = −1 if i /∈ T . Thus, if
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z = µ(T ) = (z1, . . . , zNˆ ), z′ = µ(T ′) = (z′1, . . . , z′Nˆ ) and
T ⊆ T ′, we can have zi ≤ z′i,∀i ∈ Nˆ .
The first condition in Theorem 4 actually requires a mono-
tonically increasing mapping from a set T to a constant value
ζT . As µ(T ) has already mapped the set T to a vector
z, we construct a five-layer neural network νw,b (shown in
Fig. 4) to approximate a monotonically increasing function,
i.e., νw,b(µ(T )) = νw,b(z) = ζT . The increasing mono-
tonicity here means νw,b(z) = ζT ≤ νw,b(z′) = ζT ′ if
zi ≤ z′i,∀i ∈ Nˆ . The monotonic neural network function
νw,b is described by
νw,b(µ(T )) = νw,b(z)
= max
j∈[J]
min
k∈[K]
{s(bjk2 + ewjk2s(ewj1zT + bj1))},
(40)
where J and K are positive integral hyperparameters that
affect the accuracy and complexity of the neural network, zT is
the transpose of z, wj1 ∈ RK×Nˆ , bj1 ∈ RK×1 are parameters
in the first hidden layer, and wjk2 ∈ R1×K , bjk2 ∈ R are
the parameters in the second hidden layer. The exponential
operations in (40) are used to guarantee that the weights of
the input vector z, i.e., ewj1 and ewjk2 , are always positive.
We use a shifted log-sigmoid function s(t) = log( 11+e−t ) + 1
as the activation function which also well restricts the output
range. The max-min neural network in Fig. 4 is monotonically
increasing as it follows the characterizations of the monotonic
network in [33], [34]. Next, based on the second condition
Fig. 5. The deep neural network fw,b which forms the MDL mechanism.
in Theorem 4, we construct the complete deep neural network
fw,b by integrating the monotonic network νw,b with the max
and min functions. Finally, the neural network function fw,b
of the MDL mechanism is
fw,b(µx, µy,x,y) = (xM, yM)
= (max
i∈Nˆ
{
min{νxw,b(µ(Tx(i))), xpix(i)}
}
,
max
j∈Nˆ
{
min{νyw,b(µ(Ty(j)), ypiy(i)}
}
).
(41)
According to Theorems 3 and 4, the MDL mechanism is
strategyproof. Note that the objective function in (19) is
convex with respect to LM = (xM, yM). Hence, for each data
sample (x,y), we can efficiently compute the optimal solution
L∗M = (x
∗
M, y
∗
M) to minimize the SC platform’s crowdsourcing
cost in (19) without considering strategyproofness and then
use it as the label. In the training process, we adopt the
mean squared error (MSE) to evaluate the training loss and
optimize the deep neural network parameters. Given a set of G
data samples G = {(x,y)1, . . . , (x,y)G} and corresponding
labels L∗M = {(x∗M, y∗M)1, . . . , (x∗M, y∗M)G}, the loss can be
calculated by
loss =
1
G
G∑
j=1
(lˆm(MMDL((x,y)
j); (x,y)j)
− lˆm((x∗M, y∗M)j ; (x,y)j))2, (42)
where MMDL((x,y)j) is the mobile BS’s location output by
the MDL mechanism when the input is the jth data sample
(x,y)j , j ∈ {1, . . . , G}.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we conduct simulations based on real data to
evaluate the performance of our proposed framework and strat-
egyproof deployment mechanisms. Unless otherwise stated,
the simulation configuration is set as follows. We consider
a [0, 200] × [0, 200] square-meter area as the SC task area
At. The number of registered workers is set at N = 40. We
set the height of the mobile BS h = 10 m, e.g., a drone,
the channel gain to noise ratio g = 90 dB, the bandwidth
of each subchannel B = 60 MHz, the data utility parameters
a1 = 10
4, a2 = 200, the energy conversion efficiency η = 0.6,
the antenna gain Γ = −30 dB, and the path-loss exponent
α = 2 [35]. The sensing energy cost per bit bi is generated
from the uniform distribution on [10−4, 1.1 × 10−4]. Each
measurement is averaged over more than 100 instances.
To illustrate the practical use of our proposed algorithms,
we use a real-world dataset from NYC MTA Real-Time Data
Feeds4. The dataset has more than 2 million mobility traces,
i.e. the GPS location records, of 95 workers located in New
York City over a period of one month. It is reasonable that a
worker usually estimates the working area according to its past
experience. Therefore, the historical GPS records help us to
calculate the worker’s working areaAi and maximum distance
Di. For better performance of neural network processing, we
first normalize the dataset to the range [0, 1] and respectively
prepare 24, 000 samples (training dataset) for MDL model
training and 6, 000 samples (testing dataset) for testing and
performance evaluation. Each data sample contains the work-
ers’ locations at one time slot. We randomly choose 100
samples to provide a brief overview of the prepared dataset,
as shown in Fig. 6. Each worker’s maximum distance Di is
also calculated according to the dataset. We use the Pytorch
deep learning library to implement the MDL mechanism with
K = 8, J = 8. We use the ADAM optimizer with a learning
rate of 0.005 and mini-batch of 200 when training the MDL
model. All the experiments were run on a workstation with a
GTX1080Ti GPU.
Figure 7 demonstrates the impact of the number of reg-
istered workers N on the SC platform’s utility, the average
worker’s utility and the number of employed workers in
the task allocation phase. When the number of registered
workers increases, the SC platform’s utility and the number of
employed workers gradually increase but with a diminishing
4 https://datamine.mta.info/
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Fig. 6. A brief overview of the prepared bus mobility dataset (each color
represents a worker).
Fig. 7. Impact of the number of registered workers.
return. These reflect that when more workers are employed,
the SC platform has to consume more charging power for the
same marginal utility. By contrast, the average worker’s utility
decreases with the increase of registered workers because
of the more competition among workers. Next, we present
simulation results for the data crowdsourcing phase.
Figure 8 depicts the performance of the proposed truthful
MSC mechanism in the special case as discussed in Sec-
tion V-A. As a priori information, the workers’ locations are
i.i.d. uniformly distributed over the SC task area. Thus, the
Fig. 8. The SC data crowdsourcing cost achieved by different mechanisms
with varied number of employed workers Nˆ in the special case (α = 2).
added single constant point (xc, yc) is set at the expected loca-
tion (100, 100) due to the symmetry and the analysis presented
in Section V-A. The optimal solution without considering the
incentive constraints is also calculated for comparison, which
is denoted as the OPT algorithm. Obviously, the performance
of the MSC mechanism is better (with lower crowdsourcing
cost) than that of the MED mechanism when Nˆ = 3, which
is consistent with the theoretical analysis. For Nˆ > 3, the
MSC mechanism still outperforms the MED mechanism but is
always inferior to the OPT mechanism because of the sacrifice
for guaranteeing the strategyproofness.
To illustrate the performance of our proposed mechanisms
in minimizing the SC data crowdsourcing cost lˆm, we use
the average performance ratio ωavg and the worst-case
performance ratio ωwst as the evaluation metrics. In our
experiment, they are measured based on the prepared
test dataset. The average performance ratio is defined
as the ratio of the average data crowdsourcing cost
achieved by the proposed mechanism over the average
crowdsourcing cost achieved by the OPT mechanism. The
worst-case performance ratio is defined as the highest
ratio of the data crowdsourcing cost achieved by the
proposed mechanism over the crowdsourcing cost achieved
by the OPT mechanism. Formally, given the test dataset
of Gtest data samples Gtest = {(x,y)1, . . . , (x,y)Gtest},
we take the MED mechanism for example and have
ωavgMED =
1
Gtest
∑
(x,y)j∈Gtest lˆm(MMED((x,y)
j);(x,y)j)
1
Gtest
∑
(x,y)j∈Gtest lˆm(MOPT((x,y)
j);(x,y)j)
and
ωwstMED = max(x,y)j∈Gtest
lˆm(MMED((x,y)
j);(x,y)j)
lˆm(MOPT((x,y)j);(x,y)j)
. A lower
ratio means a better performance.
Fig. 9. The performance ratio with varied path-loss exponent.
In Fig. 9, the number of employed workers Nˆ is fixed
to be 30 and we investigate the performance of the MED
mechanism and the MDL mechanism with the varied path–loss
exponent. We find that when the radio environment gets
worse (a larger path–loss exponent α), the average and worst-
case performance ratios of both the MED and the MDL
mechanism grow at different rates. In Fig. 10, we fix the
path-loss exponent α at 2.4 and study the impact of the
different number of employed workers on the performance
ratios of each proposed mechanism. Figure 10 illustrates that
the increasing number of employed workers has an implicit
impact on the performances of both proposed mechanisms.
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Fig. 10. The performance ratio with varied number of employed workers.
The main reason is that each worker’s location distribution in
the mobility dataset is different. Otherwise, if each worker’s
location follows the i.i.d distribution, more employed workers
mean more reported data which makes the hidden distribution
more certain and at least makes the average performance ratio
of the MED mechanism decline. This phenomenon can be seen
in Fig. 8. Therefore, the impact of the number of employed
workers is closely related to the characteristic of the used
dataset. In summary, compared with the MED mechanism, the
deep learning based mechanism, i.e., the MDL mechanism,
shows two clear advantages in the considered complicated
scenario. The first advantage is noticeable stability. In Fig. 9,
it can be observed that the worst performance ratio of the
MED mechanism increases exponentially with the increasing
path-loss exponent, while the MDL mechanism shows an
approximately linear increasing trend. The second advantage
is the significant performance improvement. As illustrated
in Fig. 10, the MDL mechanism achieves at least 5.19%
(18.39%) reduction in average (worst-case) performance ratio
compared to the MED mechanism.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a wireless powered spatial
crowdsourcing framework composed of two phases. In the
task allocation phase, we have proven that the proposed
Stackelberg game based incentive mechanism can help the
SC platform efficiently allocate the tasks and the wireless
charging power. For the deployment of the mobile BS in
the data crowdsourcing phase, we have adopted the classical
strategyproof median mechanism. We have also designed a
conventional strategyproof mechanism and a deep learning
based strategyproof mechanism from a Bayesian point of
view. Besides avoiding the dishonest worker’s manipulation,
extensive experimental results based on synthetic and real-
world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
framework in allocating tasks and charging power to workers.
It is worth noting that, in this paper, we use the data trans-
mission rate as a general metric to evaluate the data utility.
In future work, we will take other specific data attributes
into consideration, such as the location and timeliness. For
the time-varying scenario, we can also develop a dynamical
deployment mechanism using deep reinforcement learning.
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